New Democracies Can Be Undermined By Elites Who Prefer Dictatorship To The Rule Of Law

October 16, 2001

University Park, Pa. -- Many democracies worldwide, especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America, have socioeconomic and political elements, such as the continued presence of the military or ex-communist bureaucrats, that sometimes retard or disrupt full democratization. Nations facing this dilemma, particularly new democracies, might benefit from the lessons of Germany during the 1920s, when a initial brave attempt at democratization was ultimately brought down by the voting power of entrenched elites who preferred Hitler to the rule of law, according to a Penn State political scientist in a new study.

The post-World War II Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) has generally been considered the first successful experiment in German democracy, made possible in large part by the Allied victory and the subsequent military occupation of western Germany by the Allied powers. Had western Germans alone cast the votes, democracy might have taken permanent root in Germany prior to World War II and perhaps even forestalled the Nazi takeover, says Dr. Michael H. Bernhard, associate professor of political science.

Democratic institutions and attitudes were surprisingly strong in the western sections of Germany during the 14 years the country was governed by the Weimar Republic (1919-33), Bernhard notes. He points out that support for Adolf Hitler and the Nazis was much more pronounced in eastern Germany, which was traditionally dominated by the semi-feudal landed aristocracy and their allies in the military-industrial complex.

"The Weimar Republic gave way to the Third Reich when the Weimar president Paul von Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor on Jan. 30, 1933," Bernhard says. "In the election of March 5, Hitler, using strong-arm tactics against his political opponents and the suspension of civil liberties, orchestrated a decisive coalition between the Nazis and the ardently nationalist and anti-democratic German National People's Party (DNVP). This allowed him to achieve a nationwide majority in the Reichstag, which immediately approved the Enabling Act allowing Hitler to ignore the Reichstag and the Weimar constitution and legalize Nazi dictatorship."

Bernhard's findings appeared in the paper, "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal," published in a recent issue of the journal Comparative Politics. Bernhard coded each electoral district depending on whether it became part of West Germany, pro-Soviet East Germany, Poland or the Lithuanian or Russian Soviet Republics after World War II. He then tabulated votes for all eight of the Weimar Republic elections between 1920 and 1933, comparing votes cast in the western and eastern parts of pre-World War II Germany.

Bernhard employed a conversion formula that demonstrated how the voting system transformed the percentage of votes into the percentage of mandates. He used the same formula to produce the hypothetical percentage of mandates that parties would have commanded in the Reichstag based on the basis of separate party vote totals in western and eastern Germany. "Weimar's electoral system was highly proportional, so there are only minor differences between the raw percentages of votes and the representation figures generated by the conversion formula," Bernhard says.

Prior to the postwar division of Germany, its political system was dominated by an alliance between the leaders of German heavy industry and the Junkers, an agricultural elite which made its money through the production of rye. Both Junkers and industrialists sought to protect their commercial interests by a joint tactic of imposing high tariffs and holding down domestic wages. They furthermore collaborated in a policy of imperialism and militarism that benefited both Junkers, who dominated the office corps of the military, and the industrialists, who received lucrative contracts to supply the military.

"During the early 1920s, unlike the country as a whole, western Germany exhibited robust democratic potential," Bernhard notes. "Here, votes for pro-democratic parties such as the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum) exceeded 50 percent until 1930 and approached 50 percent in the 1930 election despite the onset of the Great Depression and high unemployment levels."

By 1932, with the Depression growing more severe, support for the democratic parties declined noticeably even in western Germany. "However, despite national unemployment rates of over 40 percent -- double that of other industrial countries -- and a major drop in national income per capita, the population of western Germany continued to vote in a pattern that would have returned a plurality of democratic representatives," says Bernhard.

Even in the critical 1933 election, voters in western Germany did not give a majority to the combined Nazi and DNVP parties at 48.5 percent. In contrast, in eastern Germany, a plurality of the mandates (37.1 percent) went to democratic parties for the last time in 1930, compared with 30.5 percent for the Nazis and DNVP. Three years later, the Nazis and DNVP received 57.9 percent, compared to 26.8 percent for the democratic parties, Bernhard says.

"Germany's experience helps us understand why many new democracies fall short of full democracy or fail to consolidate themselves," Bernhard notes. "As in Germany, there may well be fundamental facets of the economic regime or social structure whose perpertuation is in the interest of entrenched elites but not in the interest of democracy. Indeed, the findings of this study alert us that such issues demand resolution if democracy is to succeed. The Junkers and the agrarian economy of the east posed a persistent and powerful barrier to democracy and its consolidation in Germany. Resolution of this question by one means or another was a necessary condition for successful consolidation."

He adds, "In Germany, this issue was finessed by the painful division of the country. In many of today's neophyte democracies, such issues must be solved in a peaceful way, while authoritarian elites use the freedoms that democracy provide to defend their privileges. This is the crucial challenge many new democracies must overcome."

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Contacts:

Paul Blaum (814) 865-9481 (o) pab15@psu.edu

Vicki Fong (814) 865-9481 (o) vfong@psu.edu

EDITORS: Dr. Bernhard can be contacted at (814) 865-3205 or mbb6@psu.edu by e-mail