Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' Is A Mind War

March 26, 2003

Philadelphia, Pa. --- Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the United States is not fighting a military campaign of overwhelming force against Iraq, according to a Penn State expert.

"In reality, the Pentagon is using a more complex and subtle strategy that mixes negotiation and bargaining with the application of deadly, but precisely focused, doses of force -- an example of military persuasion," says Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State's Delaware County Campus near Philadelphia.

Author of the 2002 book, "Military Persuasion," Cimbala explains that military persuasion is a psychological strategy mainly intended to influence the opponent's will. It does this by inflicting destruction in limited, but focused and therefore highly effective, increments.

"Evidence for the use of military persuasion in Operation Iraqi Freedom appeared at the very start of the campaign," Cimbala says. "Based on intelligence that a fleeting opportunity existed to knock Saddam Hussein and other members of his high command out with a sudden `decapitation' strike, the U.S. launched a volley of cruise missiles and bombers that buried the targeted bunkers in rubble."

This prompt attack against leadership targets was an effort to decapitate the regime in a surprise strike by removing Hussein and his sons and several of their diehard supporters. But it was significant also for what it did not do. The early attacks were not massive bombardments of the entire Iraqi military leadership or command-control system.

"The idea was to deliberately spare elements of the Iraqi military who might be disenchanted with Hussein's regime and willing to overthrow or subvert him," Cimbala says. "The strikes were a two-part message: we can attack precisely against the political regime that we regard as the enemy. And we can spare those leadership and military elements that have the potential or show willingness to cooperate with us."

A strategy of military persuasion continued into the later stages of the conflict, according to Cimbala. The United States intended a military campaign that spared as many Iraq civilians as possible and offered maximum incentives to Iraqi military personnel for surrender.

"Having to kill the enemy is unavoidable in war, but if possible, it's even better to have him surrender without fighting - it cuts the losses on both sides," says the Penn State political science researcher.

A strategy of military persuasion is valuable in obtaining cooperation from Iraqi military or civilians from whom one might obtain useful intelligence, says Cimbala. "We want to encourage anyone fed up with Hussein's brutal dictatorship and who knows anything about his military organization, internal security or weapons of mass destruction to spill their guts," he adds.

A coercive strategy like military persuasion depends very much on American skills at perceptions management, Cimbala notes. Recognizing this, the Pentagon used its electronic wizardry to take over Iraqi radio and television, sending anti-Saddam messages along with snippets of American music. As well, Iraqi military commanders, even prior to the outbreak of war, were receiving messages to their cell phone and e-mail addresses inviting them to stand down and not take part in any military campaign doomed to defeat.

Military persuasion is not easy, Cimbala warns. A strategy that combines negotiation and force is more complicated to operate than is a simple but massive war of annihilation or attrition.

"Many officers do not understand the idea of armed persuasion, as opposed to simply crushing all of the opponent's military capability and supporting infrastructure as part of the traditional maxim to `find, fix and finish' the enemy. A fine line exists between the avoidance of gratuitous destruction that is politically counterproductive, and the withholding of decisive attacks for spurious political reasons," Cimbala says. "Many officers remember Vietnam and see it as one of many examples of 'gradualism' in the application of force. To this generation of officers, gradualism is another form of self-inflicted defeatism."

One difference between Vietnam and contemporary warfare, according to Cimbala, is that the accuracy of weapons, especially long range, air delivered bombs and missiles, has improved dramatically. Another is that we have superior knowledge of the battlefield on account of the information revolution in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Furthermore, the U.S. lead in command-control, communications and computers (C4) means that we can create a "systems integration" that allows for round the clock, synchronized combat in high technology warfare.

The Penn State political scientist cautions that, although optimism about the eventual outcome of Iraqi Freedom is warranted, complacency about the road to war termination is not.

"War termination is both a political and a military process," he says. "And a successful strategy of military persuasion will have to enable the endgame so that there is an accountable Iraqi authority to acknowledge strategic surrender and stack arms."

On the other hand, a sloppy conclusion to the Iraqi war would open the door to protracted resistance by isolated Ba'athist political fedayeen and allied anti-U.S. guerilla fighters, Cimbala concludes.

The Penn State political scientist has written numerous works on international security and U.S. defense policy, including his most recently published book, "Military Persuasion: The Power of Soft" (Praeger, 2002).

**pab**

EDITORS: Dr. Cimbala is at sjc2@psu.edu by email and at 610-892-1467.

Contacts:

Paul Blaum (814) 865-9481 pab15@psu.edu

Vicki Fong (814) 865-9481 vfong@psu.edu