Terrorist Labels Shift In Policy Winds
March 19, 2003
University Park, Pa. -- Since 2001, terrorism and counter-terrorism have become the most critical issues in U.S. national domestic and foreign policy, however, the definitions of terrorism and terrorists often change depending on the current political scene either in Washington, D.C., or other capitals, says a Penn State researcher.
In a new book, “Images of Terror: What We Can and Can’t Know About Terrorism,” Philip Jenkins, distinguished professor of history and religious studies at Penn State, notes that defining terrorism is a highly political phenomenon and a subjective, complex and often self-contradictory process.
“Terrorism is not a scientific formula that would be understood identically by people in all different societies and varying eras,” says Dr. Jenkins. “The idea is shaped by politics, by bureaucrats and the media. We need to understand how we come to see certain terrorists as demon figures yet give a free pass to other groups or nations that are just as dangerous.”
The idea of state sponsorship of terrorism dates back to the 1880s when nations repeatedly supported terrorist groups quietly, pursuing tasks that couldn’t be achieved publicly, according to Jenkins’ book. Some of the worst culprits included Tsarist Russia in the early 20th century, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and Fascist Italy in the 1920s and 1930s, using terrorist surrogates to destabilize rivals in central Europe and the Mediterranean region.
In modern times, the terror network theory in the 1980s focused on nations that were then considered sponsors of terrorist attacks such as Libya, Iran and Syria, with occasional notice of Sudan and North Korea. Most recently, Iraq has topped the public list along with Iran and North Korea in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” the book notes.
“Few would deny that the regime of Iraq is a ruthless dictatorship that brutally represses its own citizens and has frequently employed terrorist tactics at home and abroad,” Jenkins writes. “Iraq has long been a major source of international terrorism, yet the exact same description fits nearly all the major powers in the Middle East including Algeria, Iran, Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Of the five, the U.S. treats Saudi Arabia as an important ally, while Iran and Syria are ‘on probation’ and Algeria is largely ignored. But in five years, the status could shuffle again.”
Ironically, Iraq enjoyed great U.S. support during the 1980s when Iran was deemed the major threat to the Middle East.
“American forces offered aid and political support to Iraq even after it was clear that the Iraqis were using chemical weapons against their enemies. Between 1980 and 1990, Iraq is so resoundingly absent from nearly all accounts of terrorism published in the 1980s. Most books cited Iraq as a victim, rather than, a perpetrator of international terrorism,” the Penn State researcher notes.
“But in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the Gulf, possibly dominating the world’s largest oil fields, then the West defeated and contained Iraq. During the 1990s, the economic power of Saudi Arabia shaped and limited possible U.S. responses to Iraq to avoid provoking Arab nationalism and Muslim sentiment. At every stage, U.S. action against terrorism and the labeling of terrorists were shaped by economic needs,” he adds.
In the 1993 World Trade Center attack, strong evidence pointed to an Iraqi role yet government and law enforcement devoted a great deal of effort to discouraging such speculations immediately. “This is not to say that federal law enforcement agencies concealed an Iraqi dimension but they did not pursue enthusiastically certain directions in their investigations,” Jenkins notes in his book. “The government then stressed the 1993 WTC attack of the work of a ‘few stupid people’ without any ties to organized terrorism.”
Again in the 2001 attacks, potent evidence seemed to link the crimes to other nations or intelligence agencies especially Iraq, but again, investigators chose to stress certain angles rather than others, the Penn State historian notes.
When the subsequent anthrax attacks occurred, the spotlight focused on the “lone wolf’ rather than any Middle Eastern connections. The U.S. administration was trying to calm the nerves of friendly Arab states over the war raging then in Afghanistan, according to the book. Arab nations were worried that popular opposition to U.S. actions could stir up a new revolutionary movement across the Middle East and spawn new support for Osama bin Laden and his followers.
Forthcoming this spring from Aldine de Gruyter Publishers, “Images of Terror” provides a critical consumer’s guide to the images of terrorism that are offered daily in the mass media. The Penn State researcher examines how the public’s perceptions of terrorism are formed by the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, academics and private experts, and the mass media. His description of the provocateur tactics used by both police and terrorist forces is especially useful for explaining why it is so difficult to assign blame for particular acts of terrorism.
“Terrorism is a real problem and requires an effective response,” Jenkins says. “But if military force is necessary, we must be absolutely certain about the appropriate targets, press the need for public debate and ask fundamental questions, rather than accept uninformed views of terrorism.”
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