Penn State Researcher Says Better Military Persuasion Would Have Aided U.S. In Iraq

March 23, 2006

Philadelphia, Pa. --- The United States has one of the best armed forces in the world, but the military and high-ranking political figures could use a few pointers on the use of military persuasion, according to a Penn State University researcher.

Stephen Cimbala, distinguished professor of political science at Penn State's Delaware County Campus in suburban Philadelphia, said the ongoing situation in Iraq is a good example of what can happen when you choose military strength over strategy. He defines military persuasion as "the threat or use of armed force in order to obtain desired political or military goals. Military persuasion is a psychological strategy intended to influence the decisions of other state or non-state actors, without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or societies.

"When you use military persuasion, you've got to ask yourself, 'how do I use force, not to blow up targets, but in step with political, economic, social and cultural measures?' especially when you're involved in an unconventional conflict,'" said Cimbala, noting that terrorism and guerilla warfare fit into this category of battle. "No matter how great the U.S. military may be executing in Iraq, there's this image projected of, 'here come the crusaders attacking an Arab country with no legitimacy.'"

Cimbala published an article, "Military Persuasion, Intelligence and the War on Terror," in the March issue of Defense and Security Analysis.

The United States would have been far better served to garner the aid and blessing of the international community—including its own allies and the United Nations—to move forward with objectives in Iraq on a multilateral basis, said Cimbala. Not only would this have served to enhance the credence of U.S. claims that war in Iraq was inevitable, it would have provided the U.S. with more military manpower and strategic options than it has had as a more unilateral combatant. International aid likely would have also made a major difference in post-war reconstructionist efforts.

Author of a 2002 book, "Military Persuasion in War and Policy," Cimbala said the U.S. went into Iraq with a great deal of naiveté for a country that had fought the Iraqis little more than a decade earlier. In the current journal article, Cimbala is quick to paraphrase famed Chinese Philosopher of War, Sun Tzu: "Know yourself and know thy enemy. To win without fighting is the acme of skill."

If the U.S. had greater intelligence within Iraq, it stands to reason it would have had a greater understanding of the resolve of the insurgency, and maybe even an opportunity to use key Iraqis to sway public opinion against the insurgency.

"In any situation where there's strife, it's the job of the government to keep the mass of fence sitters from going the way of the ideologues," he said. "At some point, the insurgents are going to need the support of this larger group of people on the fence. We needed to take a more active role in minimizing this sympathy."

To see how military persuasion can be effective when used properly, the U.S. need only look at its own example. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. military planners sought to prevail in a lightning campaign that would employ minimum numbers of American combat troops and limit U.S. casualties and collateral damage, said the Penn State political scientist.

"In order to expedite this favorable outcome, U.S. intelligence established secret prewar contact with well placed persons in the Iraqi military chain of command. These persons were induced to stand down their units or to encourage their formations to disperse at critical junctures of the campaign," he said. "The sudden meltdown of Iraqi resistance outside Baghdad in early April, 2003 and the very rapid U.S. seizure of vital centers in Baghdad against lighter than expected opposition reflected, in part, the overlap of U.S. and certain Iraqi commanders’ motivations for a less costly U.S. victory, and for the avoidance of futile resistance."

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Contact:
David Jwanier (215)-881-7446 dxj9@psu.edu